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Following serious and widespread episodes of misconduct in the financial services industry, 
regulators, international standard-setting bodies and financial institutions worldwide have been 
discussing opportune approaches to deal with conduct risk. Identifying, analysing and tackling this 
risk have become the keywords to make financial firms take proactive steps against a common 
problem. Significantly, the way misconduct risk is understood will determine the ways for dealing 
with it properly. Given the incentives and guidelines that regulators and policymakers have so far 
provided within the conduct risk debate, it is natural to review their own review of such a risk. In 
practice, this paper addresses the question of whether their interpretation constitutes a solid, clear 
and consistent basis for financial institution proper understanding and management. 
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Since the recent financial crisis, regulators have devoted considerable efforts to fortifying the 
resilience of financial markets and infrastructures.1 Along with this objective, they have placed 
closer scrutiny on market participants’ behaviour, in particular, the impact that financial 
transactions have on consumers and market integrity. This emphasis is then the rationale behind 
specific regulatory intervention named as conduct of business (COB) regulation. The COB 
regulation has a broad scope. As Tuch observes, the regulation considers financial institution 
conduct broadly, not only in relation to the transactions that the firm enters into for or on behalf of 
its clients, but also when it acts as the principal or counterparty in capital markets transactions.2 
Consequently, the COB regulation applies across the financial services industry (securities, banking 
and insurance sectors) to serve the purpose of ensuring consumer protection and the integrity of 
financial markets. In turn, much of the reasoning behind the COB regulation is traced back to the 
fact that the reputability of the financial services industry has been affected by a wave of 
wrongdoings committed by major financial institutions, whether before or after the recent financial 
crisis.3 Within this context, the COB regulation is not exclusively concerned with guaranteeing an 
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adequate level of firms’ responsibility and accountability. Mitigating the risk of poor conduct is also 
a key objective.  
Conduct risk is, therefore, another essential feature of the current post-crisis debate on 
conduct and culture in the financial sector. Currently, regulators and international standard-setting 
bodies worldwide have been urging financial firms to incorporate conduct risk management (CRM) 
into their own risk management framework.4 In particular, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has 
elaborated a toolkit of measures to mitigate conduct risk through the act of strengthening a firm 
governance framework. Among others, these measures include improving corporate culture, 
identifying collective and individual responsibilities across every business line and monitoring 
employees with a history of misconduct. Likewise, the COB regulation should address conduct of 
risk through rules that reinforce firms’ internal governance and risk management practices. 5 
Unquestionably, conduct risk has become a priority in the regulatory and financial institutions 
agenda.  
The aim of this paper to analyse the emergence and importance of the concept of conduct 
risk in the financial services sector. In this regard, the focus is not on the viability of the conduct 
risk mitigating strategies that have been so far suggested by regulators, policymakers and 
practitioners. Rather, the analysis investigates the current understanding of conduct risk proposed 
by the mentioned actors. In particular, against the argument of the absence of a specific, univocal, 
definition of conduct risk, it questions whether the way regulators and policymakers introduce and 
interpret conduct risk lead to a consistent picture of the nature and scope of conduct risk, as well as 
its relationship with other risks. Based on this approach, the main argument that this paper asserts is 
that, at this stage, there are two conflicting views on conduct risk: as a standalone risk or a 
subcategory of other risks. This conflict is not only indicative of inconsistency as to its 
understanding but also carries the potential to make its management somehow nebulous across 
firms, despite the efforts envisaged by the FSB for better coordination in the understanding and 
dealing with this risk. Accordingly, this paper intends to enhance the current literature on conduct 
risk by highlighting the need to give it what it lacks, that is, a more robust identity.  
To this end, the reminder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section explains 
the root causes and drivers that shape the concept of conduct risk and the ensuing regulatory debate. 
The third section examines the regulators’ definitions of conduct risk. Therein, the scope of conduct 
risk is reviewed with the view to understanding its nature and relation to other risks, specifically, 
operational risk. The choice of operational risk is justified by the fact that some regulators qualify it 
as a subcategory of this risk. Accordingly, this section critically analyses this categorisation against 
those views claiming a standalone nature of conduct risk. The fourth section discusses the outcomes 
of the analysis by arguing that the current understanding of conduct risk does not help financial 
institution elaborate a firm-specific definition. Then, some final reflections conclude the paper. 
 
2. Root Causes and Determinant Factors 
 
2.1. Why Conduct Risk? 
 
The term risk is always associated with negative outcomes. As such, it is widely interpreted and not 
univocally defined. Different definitions result from the various angles through which the term risk 
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is analysed. Accordingly, there can be definitions based on probabilities, uncertainty, expected 
values or objectives.6 For instance, where an emphasis is put on probability, the term risk is defined 
as ‘the expression of influence and possibility of an accident in the sense of the severity of the 
potential accident and the probability of the event’. 7  Clearly, a definition of risk based on 
probability implies an analysis of the status quo and perception of how this may be affected in 
connection with some events. The perspective changes where risk is defined as ‘a situation or event 
where something of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and where 
the outcome is uncertain’.8 Herein, uncertainty implies a lack of perception as to future results. 
Consequently, it can be seen how the use of these parameters can give the term risk either a 
concrete meaning or random connotation and thus be the source of different definitions. Besides, 
this results in different ways of measuring risk according to whether the emphasis is on probability 
or uncertainty. In any case, the proposed definitions are strictly linked with detrimental outcomes, 
which are likely or not likely to happen. In this regard, the risk literature uses the word ‘losses’.9 
This term is widely recurrent when risk is addressed in the financial world. In this regard, Moosa 
underlined how the terms ‘risk’ and ‘loss’ are conceptually different and, therefore, should not be 
used interchangeably. Specifically, the author underlined that while the former is a source of 
potential loss the latter depends on the financial institution level of exposure to risk.10 Under this 
perspective, a loss is also the outcome of a risk that the post-crisis regulatory debate has brought to 
attention and named as conduct risk.  
The concept of conduct risk arose in connection with high-profile cases of misbehaviour that 
recently affected the financial services industry worldwide, in particular, the banking sector. 
Predatory lending practices, mis-selling of financial products, the manipulation of interbank offered 
rates, as well as tax evasion and violation of anti-money laundering rules determined a widespread 
use of the term ‘misconduct’.11 This word indicates a phenomenon of systematic wrongdoings. 
These were either localised, such as the mis-selling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) products 
in the UK, or spread worldwide such as the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR). In either case, they were stigmatised as the symptom of an unhealthy culture among 
banks and other financial institutions, as entrenched in governance, remuneration, risk management 
and tone from the top. 12 Generalised bad behaviours in the financial sector are therefore the first 
pillar of the conduct risk concept.  
The flurry of consequences deriving from this phenomenon constitutes the second 
underpinning. In this respect, we need to consider the serious escalation of effects that widespread 
episodes of misconduct may have. Firstly, they undermine the reputation of the involved institutions. 
This finally hampers consumer trust and confidence in the financial sector. Indeed, it is well 
demonstrated how the above-mentioned facts, prior to and after the recent 2007-2009 financial 
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crisis, severely affected the reputation of banks and other financial institutions.13 Consequently, the 
question of how to restore consumer trust and confidence is, among others, of paramount 
importance within the ongoing debate on cultural reforms in finance.14 Secondly, misconducts are 
costly given their potential to escalate into private litigation or regulatory sanctions. In the first 
scenario, financial institutions will be liable for the damages their customers suffered because of 
their poor conduct; while in the latter, their loss relates to the fines or other financial penalties 
imposed by regulatory authorities following investigations.15 Once again, benchmark interest rate 
rigging, mis-selling of financial products and anti-money laundering rules violations are the most 
noteworthy episodes of misconduct, giving rise to sanctions and redress costs. In this regard, it is 
estimated that in the decade following the recent financial crisis the UK banks have paid £71 billion 
in fines, legal fees and compensation for misconduct.16 Similarly, fines imposed on banks by US 
and EU regulators would amount to $342 billion.17  
The combination of loss of trust, and fines or redress costs may also pose a systemic threat. 
This is another significant aspect underlining the concept of conduct risk. With specific reference to 
the European banking sector, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) elaborated on this issue. 
On the one hand, the ESRB has recognised the potential discouraging effect that redress costs, fines, 
and other financial penalties may exercise with regard to the reiteration of misconduct. On the other 
hand, the ESRB warns as to a downsize effect, that is, financial penalties may weaken the whole 
banking sector to the extent that an illegal behaviour from one institution may be perceived by 
market participants as a common practice in the entire sector. This perception not only weakens 
trust and confidence but can also create a ‘withdraw effect’.18 By way of example, where the 
banking sector is perceived as prone to misconduct and affected by sanctions, market participants 
may lose interest in engaging and competing in that sector. Under this scenario, the functioning of 
that market and its provision of services will be seriously impaired. Similar effects can occur when 
financial penalties are not in the form of monetary sanctions but result in restrictions such as a 
prohibition on engaging in certain business practices following episodes of misconduct. The 
concerned financial institution will be prevented from participating in that specific market. Even in 
this case, the functioning of that market will be jeopardised with repercussions on its users.19 
Accordingly, the ESRB stresses how the link between misconduct and financial penalties can have 
systemic implications. In practice, while misconduct affects a financial system’s confidence, 
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financial penalties may impact on the users of the financial system. This is finally detrimental to the 
purpose of finance to benefit the real economy and spur economic growth.20  
The ESRB’s warnings have received considerable scholarly attention. Recently, by 
analysing a dataset of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international banks between 2007 and 
2014, Koster and Pelster found evidence of how financial penalties following misconduct cases 
affect banks’ profitability and stock performance.21 Among other examples, this confirms the high 
level of attention by regulators, policymakers, scholars and practitioners on the issue of conduct risk. 
As shown below, this close review is traced back to its potential to impinge on consumer protection 
and the fair and safe operations of markets, in both retail and wholesale sectors.22 As such, conduct 
risk implies a broad analytical scope in relation to those who can commit misconduct and those who 
can suffer from misconduct. In the first case, not only a financial institution employee but also 
senior managers, agents and everyone acting on behalf of the institutions. In the second case, the 
spectrum is wide, ranging from individual customers, professional clients, shareholders, and so 
on.23 
Overall, the concept of conduct risk originates from systematic and generalised episodes of 
wrongdoings across the financial services industry, in particular, in the banking sector. The 
magnitude and resonance of these events paved the way for the use of the term conduct risk and are 
at the heart of the ensuing debate on how to tackle this risk.  
 
2.2. Conduct Risk Catalysts 
 
Serious conduct-related events happening before and after the recent crisis are essential but not 
exhaustive. The conduct risk concept needs to be further explained by reviewing the key factors that 
originate this risk. The former UK Financial Services Authority coined the term ‘conduct risk’. 
Afterwards, its successor, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), discussed the drivers of the so-
called ‘wholesale conduct risk’ vis-à-vis ‘retail conduct risk’.24 ‘Wholesale and ‘retail’ are domains 
for identifying different contexts and actors. Wholesale conduct risk refers to the way firms behave 
with each other. As such, it arises in the context of the business transactions among wholesale 
parties and may include market abuse practices as examples of misconduct. Retail conduct risk 
addresses a firm behaviour to its retail customers and is mainly explained in relation to the mis-
selling of financial products.25 In either case, the drivers are the same and with the potential to 
affect consumer protection and market integrity. For instance, the manipulation of interbank offered 
rates carries the risk of threatening both market integrity and consumer protection. Market integrity 
is affected to the extent that the manipulation erodes the credibility of the interest rate benchmark. 
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On the other hand, consumer protection is undermined to the extent that financial products will be 
determined in accordance with a manipulated benchmark.26  
On top of these effects are the catalysts of conduct risk. Accordingly, it is possible to 
distinguish between factors that originate, crystallise, normalise and increase conduct risk. Market 
failures, in particular, information gaps between financial firms and their clients explain the first 
category. They are conduct issues generators in both wholesale and retail markets. Speaking of 
retail markets, firms often exploit their superior knowledge and understanding of the features of 
financial products and services. This means that unsuitable products are sold taking advantage of 
the counterparty’s unavailability or lack of understanding of crucial pieces of information, such as 
the product design, risk characteristics and future performance. Indeed, notable cases of mis-selling 
of financial products to retail customers denote not only illegal exploitation of information 
asymmetries between transacting parties but also exploitation of a customer’s poor financial 
capability, meant as the ability to understand and interpret the available information.27 Financial 
institutions often (and wrongly) assume that their customers have sufficient financial capability, or 
take advantage of their poor literacy. Consequently, the risk of misconduct is concrete whenever 
this disequilibrium is not tackled appropriately.  
Even though adequate information disclosure and improvement of financial literacy are 
fundamental, they may not be sufficient. Consumers’ irrational behaviours may also play a decisive 
role in driving conduct risk. This aspect is quite complex because relates to the role that social, 
cognitive and emotional factors play in people’s economic decisions, and the extent to which they 
lead them to wrong choices. Under this perspective, unconscious factors such as heuristics and 
cognitive biases are the root causes of erroneous decisions. Heuristics are usually explained as 
mental shortcuts through which the decision-making process is shortened. Cognitive psychology 
recognises that heuristics are helpful in making judgements and decisions more quickly and 
efficiently. Nonetheless, they can also be the source of the so-called cognitive biases, which arise 
when heuristics result in wrong decisions or choices.28 In the financial services context, for instance, 
the choice of a product that is based exclusively on the financial institution’s very well-known 
brand is regarded as ‘driven by heuristics’ given the lack of consideration for the most important 
terms or characteristic of the product.29 Consumer biases are drivers of conduct risk as firms can 
exploit them to manipulate the quality and price of products to their own advantage, so that 
consumer protection, effective competition, and market integrity may be seriously hindered.30 
Overall, the combination of information problems and consumer behavioural weaknesses 
facilitate the conduct risk probability. Such a likelihood is then aggravated where conflict of interest 
situations materialise. It is acknowledged that the exploitation of information asymmetries provides 
incentives for firms to act at the expense of their clients’ interests. This can take place in various 
ways: by privileging the interest of the firm over that of clients, by serving the interest of some 
customers over those that are regarded as less profitable, or when employees advantage their own 
interests to the detriment of those of the firm of its clients.31 Further examples could be brought 
forward. In any case, it must be emphasised how the interaction between information problems and 
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conflict of interest situations may exacerbate poor outcomes for consumers. In essence, while 
information problems coupled with consumers’ shortcomings facilitate conduct risk, such drivers 
are then reinforced when a conflict of interest is effective. Their interaction consolidates conduct 
risk. Accordingly, originating factors (information problems/ consumer biases) mark the 
development stage of conduct risk while crystallising factors (conflict of interest) identify the stage 
in which conduct risk is more concrete and thus opportune management strategies need to be in 
place.  
Moreover, where firms are structured and managed in ways that are detrimental to their 
customers’ interests, the collective values, beliefs and principles underlying the organisation and 
operation of firms come under the spotlight.  In one word, poor conduct across the financial services 
industry is always associated with poor firm culture. 32  In practice, where leadership, business 
strategies, behavioural norms and reward policies are more profit-oriented misconduct is highly 
likely to flourish. For instance, a sales policy based on rewarding staff in connection with the 
volume of sales increases the risk of selling or cross-selling unsuitable products.33 Poor culture is 
therefore regarded as a driver of conduct risk. However, compared to the factors discussed earlier, 
this driver has an inherent ‘normalisation’ danger, that is, the risk that poor conduct behaviours 
become so embedded into an organisation that they are finally accepted as permissible. Crucially, at 
this stage misconduct may become a normal thing or ‘routine’.34 For these reasons, a re-focus on 
values and principles putting the benefit of customers at the centre stage of every business strategy 
is now recognised as a fundamental objective by regulators and policymakers at all levels.35  
Finally, technological developments are also identified as conduct risk determinants. 
Unquestionably, technological progress has brought numerous advantages to market participants. 
Among others, firms can now store and dispose of a larger volume of data relating to their 
customers. This enables firms to design and target their products more efficiently, as well as to price 
risks more accurately to individual customers. Equally, consumers benefit from easier and faster 
access to products and services.36 On the other hand, firms’ IT reliance poses numerous challenges. 
The constant and rapid pace of technological progress may affect the ability of firms to ensure 
efficient control over transactions that take place through digital systems. Undoubtedly, there is an 
inherent risk of security breaches and financial crime.37 Nonetheless, conduct issues may also arise 
because of a firm failure to ensure updated and correctly installed IT devices. For example, back in 
2014, the FCA fined some major UK banks for an IT incident that caused serious disruptions to 
their customers.38 The incident prevented customers from utilising the Banks’ online facilities and 
thus from accessing current accounts, making payment transfers and drawdown operations. In 
addition, they discovered that the banks did not process or record other important transactions, or 
applied the wrong credit and debit interest to their own accounts. Significantly, these disruptions 
affected the banks’ customers in the UK and abroad, as well as individuals who were not customers, 
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and who finally were unable to receive money or payments from the banks’ customers. The causes 
of the IT incident were traced back to a compatibility issue between the ’old’ software and the ‘new’ 
(upgraded) one, which ultimately led the banks’ online services to a halt. The IT incident made the 
banks responsible for inadequate IT risk exposure management.39 Hence, IT failures are regarded as 
drivers of conduct risk to the extent that they have the potential to impair the reputation of financial 
institutions and escalate into financial penalties.40  
To summarise, episodes of misconduct depend on the combination and interaction of factors 
such as information asymmetries, consumer irrational decisions and conflict of interest. In between, 
new technologies can also increase conduct risk where a firm system is not resilient enough and is 
therefore vulnerable to failures and distortions that finally escalate into losses. 
 
3.  Defining conduct risk: subcategory or standalone 
3.1. Scope and overlapping issues 
Root causes, drivers and implications of conduct risk are accepted and widely discussed among 
regulators and policymakers. Within this debate, an evolution should be noted. Some authorities at 
the EU and international level are using the term ‘misconduct risk’.41 Conduct and misconduct risk 
are used interchangeably to indicate the same phenomenon. Nonetheless, it appears that there is not 
a single, univocal definition. The former FSA in the UK, which first shared the term conduct risk 
always declined to define conduct risk. Likewise, the FCA, which underlined how financial 
institutions have different conduct risk profiles, and thus there can be different conduct risk 
assessment frameworks.42 This means that the definition of conduct risk is a financial institution 
task. Currently, some financial institutions either have a working definition or struggle with 
defining conduct risk. 43  The task of a firm-specific definition cannot be de-linked from the 
understanding provided by regulators and policymakers. In fact, despite the lack of a specific 
definition, financial regulators and supervisory authorities have provided general definitions or 
explanations that should guide financial institutions in the elaboration of their own firm-based 
definition. Under this perspective, it is worth analysing the conduct risk understanding landscape. 
This term refers to the degree of consistency in the understanding of the phenomenon in question by 
the involved actors: regulators, international standard-setting bodies and financial institutions so 
that the nature and scope of conduct risk are clear enough to result in a firm-specific definition.  
In the UK, the FCA explains conduct risk by emphasising the cause-and-effect relationship 
between a firm poor conduct and poor outcomes for its customers.44 This is the basis for further (but 
similar) definitions from other authorities. For instance, the Central Bank of Ireland refers to 
conduct risk as the risk arising from a financial services firm’s direct interaction with its 
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customers.45 Both definitions are generic because they only introduce conduct risk as the equation 
between bad behaviour and customer detriment. Accordingly, they are narrow definitions that leave 
open the quest for the scope of conduct risk and interplay with other risks. In other words, they 
stimulate to question whether conduct risk is a standalone risk or is a category of other risks. This 
depends strictly on the understanding brought forward by regulators. At the EU level, the ESRB 
expands into the cause-and-effect nexus and concludes that from the conduct of supervision 
perspective, conduct risk is a very broad concept. Specifically, this broadness results from the 
undesirability to provide a single, narrow definition of misconduct given the endless list of types of 
misconduct that could be mentioned.46 Essentially, the ESRB does not argue that it is impossible to 
define misconduct, but that it is not convenient. This justifies its view of conduct risk as too broad a 
concept to be defined, at least from the conduct of supervision perspective. Where submitted that it 
is not desirable to define misconduct and therefore embark on a specific definition of conduct risk, 
such a conclusion paves the way for firm-based definitions that replicates generic regulatory 
definitions.47 However, things may have a different perspective where a definition of ‘misconduct’ 
is provided. The FSB qualifies misconduct as the ‘conduct that falls short of expected standards, 
including legal, professional and ethical standards’.48 On the one hand, the FSB recognises that this 
definition can capture a wide taxonomy of events. In this respect, it is in line with the ESRB’s view 
that it is challenging to define conduct risk because of the wide variety of events that constitute 
misconduct. On the other hand, the FSB indicates the domains where misconduct events may arise: 
internal fraud, execution delivery and process management, business disruption and damages to 
assets, clients, products and business practices, employment practices and workplace safety. 49 
Different events can be grouped under each domain. For instance, insider trading, tax evasion, data 
falsification, forgery and unauthorised transactions pertains to internal fraud, mis-selling, market 
manipulation, money laundering/terrorist financing are included within the client, products and 
business practices domain, while misconduct causing damages to IT assets relate to the business 
disruptions and damage to assets area.50 Notwithstanding, a definition of conduct risk is still lacking. 
In essence, the taxonomy provided by the FSB delineates the contours of the scope of conduct risk, 
but once again, the provision of a definition is something the standard-setting bodies do not engage 
in.  
Should a firm-specific definition be elaborated on with this taxonomy, the potential for 
confusion could arise. By comparison, the misconduct events and their areas are the same as the 
ones that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) specifies for operational risk.51 
Besides, the type of effects deriving from these events, among others, legal liability, restitution or 
regulatory actions are the same.52 Consequently, this FSB determination of the scope of conduct 
risk through a list of misconduct events and domains where they can arise affects the identity of 
conduct risk, in the sense of potential overlapping with other risks, in this case, operational risk. 
This potential seems to be more apparent where the definition of operational risk provided by the 
BCBS, as the ‘risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems 
                                                          
45 Central Bank of Ireland (CBOI), Prism Explained How the Central Bank of Ireland is Implementing Risk Based 
Regulation <https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/Regulation/supervision/prism/gns-4-1-2-2-5-prism-
explained-feb-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=2> (accessed 18.12.2018). 
46 ESRB supra n 18, at 5. 
47 See below section 4. 
48 FSB, supra n 20, at 6. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Operational Risk (2001) 




or from external events’,53 is compared with another definition of conduct risk set out at the EU 
level. With regard to the banking sector, the European Banking Authority (EBA) defines conduct 
risk as the ‘the current or prospective risk of losses to an institution arising from inappropriate 
supply of financial services, including cases of wilful or negligent misconduct’.54 They seem to 
have the same core elements. First, the risk of loss affecting the concerned institution. Second, the 
fact that the potential for loss derives from conduct. Third, as mentioned above, the types of 
conducts are the same and can be either wilful or negligent. For instance, the internal fraud area 
relates to losses deriving from acts intended to defraud or circumvent regulations, the law or 
company policy, while the clients and products and business practices area refers to losses that are 
consequential to unintentional breaches of professional obligations relating to specific clients, or to 
obligations concerning the design and characteristic of a financial product.55  
These similarities raise an identity issue for conduct risk, which finally results from the way 
conduct risk is defined and interpreted. Consequently, such a scenario brings into question whether 
conduct risk overlaps with operational risk or is encompassed by operational risk. There may be 
different implications. Overlapping may mean a strong level of coincidence between the 
components of two risks so that one could be regarded as superfluous; or may be the result of a 
definition that still needs further elaboration and clarity. In this case, it can be assumed that the two 
risks are independent and therefore it is necessary to set out a definition of conduct risk that leaves 
no doubt about a potential overlapping with operational risk. However, where the EBA’s definition 
is accepted, another conclusion can be that conduct risk does not overlap but is a type of operational 
risk. Significantly, the BCBS has so far not officially recognised conduct risk as opposed to the 
mentioned supervisory authorities. Indeed, conduct issues are treated within the operational risk 
framework.56 This reinforces the above questions and makes further investigation worthwhile.  
 
3.2. Conduct risk as a subset of operational risk 
In reality, the argument of a potential overlapping with operational risk could be contradicted in the 
light of further clarifications provided by the European supervisory authorities. Even though the 
ESRB has pointed out the difficulties in defining conduct risk from a conduct supervision 
perspective, it then qualified it as a ‘subset of operational risk’ from a prudential perspective.57 The 
EBA echoes this interpretation as its definition regards conduct risk as a ‘subcategory’ of 
operational risk.58 Consequently, overlapping issues would have no reason to exist. Where conduct 
risk does not overlap with operational risk, it may be a subcategory or subset of the latter. It is 
worth reflecting over these qualifications. Theoretically, a subcategory qualification would imply a 
type of relationship in which operational risk is the parent category and conduct risk is a narrower 
category. In other words, where a category is defined as a collection of objects, and objects are the 
elements of the category, a subcategory is itself a category whose objects are a restriction of the 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54 European Banking Authority (EBA), Guidelines on Common Procedures and Methodologies for the Supervisory 
Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) <https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/935249/EBA-GL-2014-
13+(Guidelines+on+SREP+methodologies+and+processes).pdf> (accessed 21.12.2018). Although this definition was 
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services industry. 
55See BCBS, QIS2-Operational Risk Loss Data (2001) <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/qisoprisknote.pdf> (accessed 
21.12.2018). 
56 See Antje Hargarter & Gary van Vuuren, Assembly of a Conduct Risk Regulatory Model for Developing Market 
Banks, 1 South African Journal of Management Studies 20,1 (2017). 
57 ESRB, supra n 18. 
58 EBA, supra n 54. 
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parent category’s objects. 59  Logically, there is a hierarchical relationship between the parent 
category and the subcategory. Assuming that conduct risk is a subcategory of operational risk, this 
raises the question of which elements determine operational risk as the parent category and conduct 
risk as a subcategory. As pointed out, the two risks have the same trigger events, but their respective 
scopes may differ in consideration of their relationship with other risks. In this regards, the BCBS 
definition of operational risk specifies that it includes legal risk60 but excludes strategic risk61 and 
reputational risk.62 On the other hand, absent a specific definition of conduct risk, commentators 
interpret conduct risk as including strategic and reputational risk other than legal risk.63 Once again, 
this is sufficient to exclude an overlapping between the two risks, but leads to verifying whether 
what they include and exclude can still determine a category/subcategory relationship. To this end, 
it may be helpful to analyse the meaning of the term ‘subset’ used by the ESRB. Under the set 
theory, a subset should include all or some of the elements of a set, which is also defined as the 
superset.64  
To define conduct risk as the subset of operational risk, the ESRB refers to the definition of 
operational risk under the so-called ‘CRD-IV package’, namely the definition incorporated in the 
EU Regulation No 575/2013. This replicates the BCBS’s definition, but without the specification of 
the exclusion of strategic and reputational risk.65 Assuming that a superset/subset relationship can 
be determined through equality (‘all elements’) of elements, we might conclude that conduct risk is 
a subset of operational risk in that equality would be determined by the same events that lead to a 
financial institution’s loss. However, where other risks are also part of the concept of operational 
risk, there can be further causes for reflection. As mentioned above, the BCBS definition of 
operational risk states that it ‘includes legal risk and ‘excludes strategic and reputational risk’, while 
it is argued that conduct risk includes these two risks. According to the set theory, conduct risk 
could be still regarded as a subset of operational risk even under the perspective of the risks they 
include or exclude. Indeed, ‘some’ of the elements the categories include can also determine a 
superset/subset relationship. Consequently, legal risk is the determinant of equality in addition to 
the trigger events. Strategic and reputational risk, however, are not found in the superset operational 
risk. This would not mean that the hierarchical relationship is doubtful. Again, the set theory 
explains that, in addition to the elements in common with the superset, a subset also includes 
elements that are not found in the superset.66 For this reason, it is defined as a proper or strict subset. 
Hence, conduct risk might be regarded as a strict or proper subset of operational risk to the extent 
that it has in common with the latter trigger events and legal risk, and also includes strategic and 
reputational risk that are not found in operational risk.  
                                                          
59 Tom Leinster, Basic Category Theory vol. 143 Cambridge Studies in Advanced Mathematics, 9 (Cambridge 
University Press 2014). 
60 ‘Legal risk includes, but is not limited to, exposure to fines, penalties, or punitive damages resulting from supervisory 
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61 ‘Strategic risks is the current or prospective risk to earnings and capital arising from changes in the business 
environment and from adverse business decisions, improper implementation of decisions or lack of responsiveness to 
changes in the business environment’, see EBA, Guidelines On The Application of the Supervisory Review Process 
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3def3127f545> (accessed 23.12.2018).  
62 ‘Reputational risk means the current or prospective risk to the institution’s earnings own funds or liquidity arising 
from damage to the institution’s reputation, see EBA, supra note at 17.  
63 English, Hammond and Kovas, supra note 
64 Charles C Pinter, A Book of Set Theory, 15 (Dover Publications, Inc 2014). 
65 See Article 4(52) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, 2013 OJEU (L176/1). 
66 Pinter, supra n 64. 
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A strict subset relationship supposes that the subset has fewer elements than the superset. 
Quantitatively, conduct risk appears to include more risks than operational risk where we read the 
BCBS definition of operational risk. Nonetheless, studies on operational risk bring to attention the 
complexity of this risk and the fact that, on its own, encompasses a wide variety of other types of 
risks in addition to legal risk: liquidity risk, Hersttat risk, compliance risk, processing risk, system 
risk, human resources risk, disaster risk, fiduciary risk, model risk.67 Furthermore, other scholars 
contend the exclusion of strategic risk based on the argument that strategic management is 
connected with the areas where operational risk arises.68 Likewise, others underline the reputational 
impact of large operational risk events and their substantial damages, which are often higher than 
the cost of the direct event.69 Even though there is not an exhaustive list of subcategories, this 
understanding of operational risk places it as the parent category of other categories of risks.  
Overall, it is highly recognised that operational risk has risen as ‘a key component of the 
global financial industry regulation’. 70  By reviewing the terminology used by the European 
supervisory authorities to categorise conduct risk and the BCBS definition of operational risk, a 
recalibration of the nature of conduct risk, as a subcategory of operational risk, might be supported. 
  
3.3. Conduct risk as a standalone risk 
The qualification of conduct risk as a subset of operational risk, however, is not entirely accepted 
against the backdrop of a stark difference between them. While operational risk appraises potential 
damages to a financial institution consequently to internal and external factors, conduct risk relates 
to potential damages to consumers and market integrity.71 This argument is worthy of analysis. 
Under this perspective, conduct risk undertakes a new dimension, namely as a standalone risk. 
Indeed, the hierarchical dimension that characterises the connection between the two risks within 
the superset/subset argument is contradicted by the wider repercussions of conduct risk. In terms of 
the effects, operational risk would be confined to the concerned financial institution, while conduct 
risk would have wider implications due to its potential impact on financial stability.72 Within this 
context, there is also a major difference between the events underlining the two risks, though they 
are the same. Operational risk loss events would remain circumscribed to the affected firm, while 
conduct risk loss events have implications for the financial system. Under this angle, it is hard to 
relegate conduct risk as a subset of operational risk. Overall, this argument emphasises how the 
potential economic impairment to the system is the distinguishing characteristic of conduct risk so 
that it must be qualified and analysed as a standalone risk.73 Accordingly, conduct risk neither 
overlaps with operational risk nor is its subset, it is a distinguishable risk. This view is also 
reinforced by those scholars stressing that operational risk does not address those misbehaviours 
that have the potential to create market distortions and thus ‘is an antiquated view of misconduct 
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that has not been updated to reflect the post-crisis macro-prudential approach’. For this reason, they 
urge a measure of reform of the Basel framework to include conduct risk as a ‘priority risk’ and the 
adoption of supervisory requirements tailored to this risk.74  
These interpretations reflect the widely accepted perception of operational losses as firm-
specific, that is, purely idiosyncratic with no systemic implications. However, these views are 
debatable as recent studies argue in favour of the systemic implications of operational events.75 
There is, in fact, a new strand of literature demonstrating systemic contagious effects of operational 
losses in the context of pre-crisis and post-crisis wrongdoings involving major banks worldwide. 
For instance, by analysing significant operational loss events across European banks some authors 
found empirical evidence of spill-over effects of operational loss announcements from the interested 
firm to the European banking industry.76 The same conclusions have been asserted with regard to 
US banking organisations. In particular, with reference to operational losses following event types 
such as internal fraud, client products and business practices, as well as execution, delivery and 
process management, other studies showed the association between large operational losses and 
systemic risk across the US banking industry.77 Moreover, some scholars refer to the UK PPI 
scandal as an example of ‘systemic operational risk’ by underlining how the sale of unsuitable 
products to customers by bank staff was detrimental in terms of consumer protection, escalated into 
heavy regulatory sanctions and finally prompted some banks to exit the PPI market.78  
Within this context, it can be seen how operational loss events have the same effects of 
conduct risk loss events. Consequently, the line of demarcation between them is rather blurred. 
These studies have not only the potential to influence the regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions but also to shed new light that makes the nature and limits of operational risk, above all, 
its idiosyncratic nature highly debatable. On the other hand, within the debate on the qualification 
of conduct risk, they may reshape the power relationship between conduct and operational risk. 
Where it is submitted that operational risk poses systemic threats, it is no longer an ’antiquated’ risk 
vis-à-vis conduct risk. Similarly, the assumption that operational losses events may be ‘systemic 
operational losses’ reignites the discussion on what conduct risk is and how relates to other risk, 
that is, whether and to what extent distinguishes from others, whether and why is a subcategory of 
other risks, or finally has the potential to overlaps with other risks. 
 
4. Where does it fit? 
The question of whether conduct risk is a duplication, a subset of operational risk or a standalone 
risk is only an example of the problems surrounding the definition of this risk. The discussion could 
go beyond operational risk as some scholars qualify conduct risk as a ‘form of legal risk’,79 while 
some firms subsume it under compliance risk. 80  It may be argued that as operational risk 
encompasses these two risks, conduct risk may appear as the subset of the operational risk’s subsets. 
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Similarly, a recent study ranks conduct risk as fifth within a classification of ten major operational 
risks.81 In this regard, however, it is noted how some of the risks ranked before, such as for example 
cyber risk and data security, regulation or outsourcing have some conduct risk characteristics.82 
This once again proves that the way conduct risk is interpreted does not lead to a solid, clear and, 
above all, univocal understanding. This also influences the way that financial institutions define 
conduct risk.  
As mentioned above, some institutions have a definition while others have explicitly 
declared their difficulties in providing even a working definition. By referring to the institutions that 
brought forward a definition of conduct risk, different emphasis can be noticed. For examples, some 
banks define conduct risk as the detriment deriving to customers, clients, counterparties, the 
institution and its employees because of poor judgement in the execution of business activities.83 
This definition resembles the understanding provided by the FCA, which regards the connection 
between poor outcomes and poor conduct as the building blocks of the concept of conduct risk. 
Other institutions rephrase this connection by underlining the violation of regulations, laws, or the 
failure to meet customers’ expectation as the cause of misconduct and ensuing detriment.84 In 
between, some other firms entangle the term conduct risk to culture so that they are defined as one 
word, ‘conduct risk and culture’, referring to as a ‘shared set of behavioural norms’ that ensure 
customer and shareholder protection, as well as market integrity.85 Furthermore, other financial 
institutions categorise conduct risk as ‘brand risk’ or ‘reputational risk’.86 Finally, there are those 
firms that simply explain the conduct risk assessment and management strategies, but decline to 
provide any specific definition.87  
Significantly, all these definitions are modelled upon some of the characteristics and effects 
that the regulators have so far indicated as components of the concept of conduct risk. However, 
grounds for ambiguity remain to the extent that these definitions bring the same problems of clarity 
as the regulator general definitions. Alike, the firm context is only sufficient to grasp where conduct 
risk originates and why there is a conduct risk debate, but finally they do not offer significant 
elements to understand the nature of conduct risk, that is, as a standalone risk or subcategory of 
another risk. At this stage, it can be said that there is not a definitive answer to the questions posed 
above. Among the arguments brought forward, the overlapping issue with operational risk appears 
to be a stretch to the extent that the EBA’s definition and the ESRB’s interpretation place conduct 
risk under the realm of operational risk as a subcategory. This, however, is the source of conflict 
with those views claiming the autonomy of conduct risk. In between, further cause for reflections is 
offered by other views of conduct risk as a kind or type of other risks, or even encompassing other 
risks. These ultimately add confusion to the already nebulous nature of conduct risk. Finally, 
financial institutions reflect this confusion in their own definitions. Consequently, the main problem 
is not the existence of different definitions of conduct risk but the lack of a clear identity of this risk. 
Establishing with certainty this nature is crucial against the current debate aiming at ensuring better 
coordination in the assessment and management of this risk.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
Definitions are essential to stimulate discussions and create convergence on meanings. Conduct risk 
is a new concept that emerged in the wake of collective conduct failures in the financial services 
industry. As such, it lacks a specific definition because a one-size-fits approach in its management 
is not possible as firms have different conduct risk profiles.88 Nonetheless, it is also submitted that 
convergence on its characteristic of risk affecting consumer protection and market integrity is per se 
sufficient to give a solid knowledge of this risk.89 In reality, this agreement is only sufficient to 
justify the existence of conduct risk. This paper argues that the way conduct risk is interpreted by 
regulators is far from an offer of clarity. Until now, regulators have been reluctant in bringing 
forward any specific definition. This may depend on several reasons, among others, the fact that 
conduct risk has emerged very recently and thus further research is needed. At this stage, there are 
only generic definitions that indicate how regulators interpret or consider this risk. Even these 
generic understandings are not definitive as to the nature and scope of conduct risk. Critically, the 
paper shows that conduct risk is trapped between its being considered as the subset of operational 
risk or as a standalone risk. Under the first dimension, conduct risk is encompassed within another 
risk; while the second dimension gives conduct risk its own autonomy. Both arguments appear to 
have strengths and weaknesses and therefore there is nothing conclusive. However, they represent 
the starting point for widening the debate towards the identity of conduct risk. There can be 
multifaceted approaches for the management of conduct risk, but the question of whether conduct 
risk stands needs an answer. This question cannot be ignored for several reasons. First and foremost, 
coordination across the financial services industry is urged with regard to the mitigation and 
management of conduct risk. Thus, a univocal understanding of the nature and scope of conduct 
risk underpins the achievement of this objective. Second, its clear deconstruction permits better 
predictions on how this risk will evolve. Consequently, the awareness of the existence of conduct 
risk needs to be completed with an answer to the fundamental question of where it stands. 
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